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The period preceding the global financial crisis was characterized by a substantial widening of current
account imbalances across the world. Since the onset of the crisis, these imbalances have contracted
to a significant extent. In this paper, we analyze the ongoing process of external adjustment in advanced
economies and emerging markets. We find that countries whose pre-crisis current account balances
were in excess of what could be explained by standard economic fundamentals have experienced the
largest contractions in their external balance. We subsequently examine the contributions of real exchange
rates, domestic demand and domestic output to the adjustment process (allowing for differences across
exchange rate regimes) and find that external adjustment in deficit countries was achieved primarily
through demand compression, rather than expenditure switching. Finally, we show that changes in
other investment flows were the main channel of financial account adjustment, with official external





Dublin 2  IRELAND
plane@tcd.ie
Gian Maria Milesi Ferretti
International Monetary Fund
Western Hemisphere Department, HQ1-10-120
700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
gmilesiferretti@imf.org
An online appendix is available at:
http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w17352 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The period preceding the global financial crisis that began in 2008 was characterized by widening 
current account imbalances across the globe, reflecting a variety of factors: rising oil prices, credit 
booms and asset price bubbles, and generally easy external financing conditions. The global crisis 
was associated with a dramatic change in these conditions: sharp declines in asset prices and oil 
prices, tightening credit, and a drying-up of external finance for several heavily indebted 
countries, some of which turned to external assistance from the IMF and the European Union. 
Evidence on the impact of the crisis on output and demand suggests that countries running large 
current account deficits during the pre-crisis years were the most severely affected, with declines 
in domestic demand being particularly dramatic (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011).  
 
In this paper, we analyze the external adjustment process following the financial crisis. Our 
hypothesis is that pre-crisis current account imbalances widened beyond levels consistent with 
sustainable medium-term positions. The emergence of large imbalances was facilitated by a 
benign global financial environment, with low risk aversion among lenders and borrowers 
coupled with over-optimistic expectations about future growth in deficit countries and 
amplification mechanisms associated with rising housing and financial asset prices in recipient 
countries.
1 As a result, a number of countries borrowed heavily, with net external liabilities 
quickly expanding. For example, in 2000 average net external liabilities were around 36 percent 
of GDP in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, and around 38 percent of GDP in the Baltics. By the 
end of 2007, average net external liabilities amounted to 87 percent of GDP in the three euro 
countries and close to 70 percent of GDP in the Baltics. After this rapid expansion in external 
liabilities, external conditions changed drastically during the crisis, triggering a painful process of 
current account adjustment.  
                                                        




In our empirical analysis, we first seek to establish the extent to which current account balances 
prior to the crisis exceeded levels consistent with underlying economic fundamentals. We next 
ask whether the current account adjustment following the crisis was sharper in countries where 
pre-crisis “excesses” were more evident. The answer to this question is a resounding yes—
countries whose current account balances were in excess of what could be explained by standard 
economic fundamentals prior to the crisis also experienced the largest contractions in their 
external balance.  
 
We subsequently examine how external adjustment has taken place.  Have real exchange rate 
movements contributed through an expenditure-switching channel? Or has expenditure 
reduction been the primary mechanism for the closing of excessive deficits? Has the adjustment 
experience differed between countries with fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes? The 
evidence suggests that the adjustment in deficit countries took place primarily through a 
compression of output and demand. In fact, real effective exchange rates moved in a 
destabilizing direction among the group of pegging countries and were only weakly tied to the 
current account among countries with an intermediate or floating regime. Finally, we turn to a 
closer examination of the behavior of capital flows during this period. We ask two questions.  
First, we investigate what types of flows were associated with changes in current account 
balances. Second, we explore the role played by official flows (including automatic flows among 
member central banks within the euro area) in the adjustment process.  
 
Our contribution is linked to the literature on global imbalances (see, for example, Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 2010 and Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2010 for recent discussions). However, our 
focus is on the evolution of the current account balances relative to domestic GDP across a wide 
range of advanced economies and emerging markets, rather than on the absolute size of cross- 3  
 
border borrowing and lending. Our paper is also related to the burgeoning empirical literature 
seeking to explain medium-term current account behavior across countries (see, for example, 
Chinn and Prasad, 2003, Gruber and Kamin, 2007, Chinn and Ito, 2007, Lee et al, 2008 and 
Gagnon, 2011). While our empirical medium-term current account model is very related to the 
ones used in those papers, our primary goal is exploit the model to construct a “fitted” current 
account series that allows us to check whether current account movements after the crisis have 
gone in the general direction of reducing divergences between actual and fitted current account 
balances. Finally, our work is linked to the literature on current account reversals and sudden 
stops (see Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 2000, Edwards 2003, Adalet and Eichengreen 2007 and 
Freund and Warnock 2007, amongst others).  While that literature largely focuses on country 
episodes of large current account improvements drawn from different time periods, we analyze 
the cross-section of current account adjustment for a specific time period, simultaneously 
looking at both deficit and surplus countries. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents some stylized facts about 
the behavior of current account balances during the crisis and also provides a brief review of the 
theoretical literature on the external adjustment process in the event of a global financial shock. 
We turn to empirical analysis of current account behavior and adjustment mechanisms in Section 
III. Section IV concludes.  
 
II. THE COMPRESSION IN CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES, 2008-2010 
 
Figure 1 plots the standard deviation of the cross-country distribution of current account 
balances (expressed as ratios to GDP) over the 1995 to 2010 period.
2  The figure captures the 
                                                        
2 Our focus in this paper is on external balances vis-à-vis each country’s GDP, since we are interested in country-
level macroeconomic adjustment issues.  For other purposes, it would be more appropriate to scale imbalances by 
global GDP.  4  
 
sustained increase in dispersion over 1997 to 2008, with an especially sharp increase from 2004 
onwards, followed by a substantial compression since 2008. In Figure 2, we provide a selective 
view of the size of current account adjustment in different countries and regions. In particular, 
the figure shows the dramatic reduction in current account deficits in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the sizable but much smaller reduction in deficits in the euro area periphery, as well as 
the substantial decline in current account surpluses in China and oil exporters. The figure also 
illustrates that changes in the “oil balance” did not play a central role in the adjustment, with the 
rebound in oil prices in 2010 offsetting the decline in the early stages of the crisis.  
 
We view the process of widening current account imbalances during the period preceding the 
crisis (particularly during 2004-2008) as reflecting a variety of factors, among which asset price 
booms and easy access to external finance are particularly crucial.
3 The crisis was associated with 
a sharp increase in risk aversion, declining asset prices, and significant downward revisions to 
growth expectations for a variety of countries. Indicators such as the VIX on the S&P 500 or the 
corporate bond spread between AAA-rated and BAA-rated bonds clearly point to tighter 
financial conditions. 
 
In terms of a conceptual framework, the body of work on ‘sudden stops’ (that is, rapid 
narrowing of external imbalances) is clearly relevant for analyzing the experience of deficit 
countries.
4 In particular, models in which there is a global change in financial conditions are 
helpful in thinking about the compression in the cross-country distribution of current account 
imbalances. Furthermore, viewing the crisis as a global financial shock is desirable since such a 
perspective is also capable of explaining the enormous decline in gross capital flows during the 
                                                        
3 See Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) for a narrative of the different phases of global imbalances. 
4 Mendoza (2010) is one prominent recent example.  5  
 
most acute phase of the crisis (Forbes and Warnock, 2011, Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011).
5 
 
Such a global financial shock might be captured by an increase in the risk premium charged on 
external liabilities or by an increase in financial home bias. For instance, Blanchard et al (2010) 
develop a model of a small, emerging economy in which these different types of shocks can be 
analyzed, and show that both an increase in financial home bias and an increase in the risk 
premium are associated with a narrowing of the external balance and a decline in domestic 
output.
6 Similarly, in the IMF’s Global Economic Model, which is a general-equilibrium 
macroeconomic model of the world economy, an increase in the risk premium on external debt 
can be shown to deliver a reduction in external imbalances and a decline in output in debtor 
countries (see, amongst others, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007). The recessionary impact of a 
sharp decline in net capital inflows is a function of the negative impact on domestic demand in 
an environment with nominal rigidities. Furthermore, the negative impact on output can be 
amplified in the presence of credit market frictions by which the associated declines in domestic 
asset prices generate negative feedback loops through the collateral channel (see Mendoza 2010, 
amongst others). 
 
Finally, a common theme in this literature is that the impact of a sudden stop will differ across 
exchange rate regimes (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2001, 2007a, 2007b; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007).  
Under most configurations, if a country is unable to offset the domestic demand shock through 
expansionary monetary policy and/or accomplish real exchange rate adjustment through 
nominal devaluation, the recessionary impact will be larger than in the case of a flexible exchange 
rate regime. However, this relies on exchange rates moving in a stabilizing direction, which may 
                                                        
5 A short cut is provided by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001, 2007a, 2007b). These authors simply impose a sudden 
reduction in current account imbalances and work out the implications for real exchange rate behavior. However, 
since they focus on endowment economies, they cannot provide ancillary hypotheses concerning the behavior of 
output during sudden stop episodes.   
6 However, the exchange rate response differs across the different types of financial shock.  6  
 
not hold if there are shocks in currency markets. 
 
In summary, the main predictions from the research literature are that an adverse shift in global 
financial conditions should deliver a narrowing in current account imbalances, with deficit 
countries experiencing real exchange rate depreciation and a decline in relative output. Moreover, 
the relative contributions of exchange rate adjustment and output adjustment should differ 
across exchange rate regimes. We empirically investigate these questions in the next section. 
 
III.  PRE-CRISIS FACTORS AND CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT 
 
In this section, we ask whether pre-crisis variables help to explain the change in the current 
account during the crisis. In particular, we investigate whether the current account adjustment 
which occurred during the crisis can be viewed as stabilizing, in sense of correcting “excessive” 
imbalances that may have emerged during the pre-crisis period. The prevailing narrative of the 
2005-2008 period is that sharp increase in the dispersion of current account balances during this 
period may in part be attributed to a financial environment characterized by low global interest 
rates, increased risk tolerance among global investors and/or increased risk taking among deficit 
countries. Under this view, current account imbalances had a non-sustainable component during 
this period that was due for elimination once the froth in credit markets dissipated. 
 
In order to investigate this question, it is necessary to have an estimate of the “equilibrium” 
distribution of current account balances, since a zero balance is not the right benchmark for 
most countries. As is attested by an extensive empirical literature, persistent differences in 
current account balances can be linked to a set of macroeconomic fundamentals. Our strategy is 
to capture the “excess” component as the deviation from the equilibrium value suggested by 
these fundamentals. Accordingly, we proceed by estimating a standard empirical model of  7  
 
medium-term current account determination. By now, this type of estimation is fairly standard 
(such as Chinn and Prasad, 2003; Gruber and Kamin, 2007; Lee et al., 2008; Gagnon 2011).
7 
Subsequently, we use the model to construct a gap measure between current account balances 
and their model-fitted values for the period 2005-08, and we then examine whether current 
account adjustment during the crisis is related to the size of this gap measure.  
 
The current account equation is estimated over the period 1969-2008, with the current account 
and its explanatory variables measured as 4-year averages to smooth business-cycle fluctuations. 




it it it j CA X      
  
Where  is the current account (expressed as a ratio to GDP) and 
j
it X are explanatory 
variables. The selection of regressors largely follows the specifications reported in the previous 
literature. In particular, this general approach is also employed by the IMF in assessing medium-
term current account equilibria (see Lee et al 2008). Where appropriate, variables are measured in 
relative terms, since only idiosyncratic shifts in fundamentals should affect the current account.  
The specific regressors are: 
 
  The relative fiscal balance (expressed as a ratio to GDP and measured relative to a weighted-
average of the fiscal balance of country i’s trading partners). Its inclusion is motivated by the 
many factors that can induce a departure from Ricardian Equivalence (see also Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti 2002) and its expected sign is positive. 
 
                                                        
7 In some cases (such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002), the focus is on equilibrium net foreign asset positions rather 
that the equilibrium current account balance. 
it CA 8  
 
  The GDP growth rate (measured relative to a weighted-average of the growth rates of 
country i’s trading partners), included to capture the strength of convergence factors, and is 
expected to be negatively correlated with the current account balance. 
 
  The relative level of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita (in logs, relative to a weighted-average of 
country i’s trading partners), included to capture the convergence process—to the extent that 
the income level is a proxy for the marginal product of capital. Its expected sign is positive. 
 
  The old-age dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of the population aged 65 and older to the 
working-age population, and measured relative to a weighted-average of country i’s trading 
partners). This variable is expected to have a negative impact on the current account balance 
because retirees typically draw down their savings. 
 
  The population growth rate (measured relative to a weighted-average of country i’s trading 
partners). This variable is expected to have a negative effect on the current account balance 
(as the very young do not save). 
 
  The aging rate. This variable is new in the literature.
8 It is defined as the expected change in 
the old-age dependency ratio in the future (constructed as the difference between the age 
dependency ratio in year t+20 and the ratio in year t, where the t+20 estimate is based on 
United Nations population projections). Ceteris paribus, we would expect countries where 
the population is getting old more rapidly to have higher saving. 
 
                                                        
8 See also Lane (2010).  9  
 
  The net export position in oil (expressed as a ratio to GDP) as well as its interaction with a 
Norwegian country dummy. The oil balance is included to capture the impact of fluctuations 
in the oil price (given the different extent of “oil intensity” in production and relatively rigid 
demand in oil importers). We also allow the oil balance to play a different role for Norway, 
in view of the country-specific institutional arrangements that govern the management of its 
oil revenues. 
 
  The lagged value of the net foreign asset position expressed as a ratio to GDP (say, 
NFA/GDP at end-2004 for the 2005-08 period). It is included since the steady-state current 
account balance should be proportional to the equilibrium net foreign asset position in a 
growing economy, and has a positive expected sign. 
 
  A crisis dummy variable capturing whether a country is experiencing a major economic crisis 
in year t, included to capture the disruption in access to capital markets for countries 
undergoing a financial crisis. It is expected to have a positive coefficient.  
 
  An Asian crisis dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 1997-2000 for those Asian 
economies at the center of the Asian financial crisis and 0 otherwise. It is included to capture 
the specific disruptions associated with the 1997-2000 period in Asia, and is expected to have 
a positive sign.  
 
  A dummy variable capturing whether a country is a major center for international financial 
trade. The financial center dummy is relevant, in view of the possible measurement errors in 
tracking net capital flows for centers of international wholesale asset trade. 
   10 
 
  The terms of trade, included to capture the effects of changes in world market prices for a 
country’s exports or imports (in addition to oil prices). It is expected to have a positive sign. 
 
Our country sample includes 65 advanced economies and emerging markets (listed in the 
Appendix). We exclude countries that are oil exporters as well as countries with per capita 
income in 2007 below $1000 and very small countries (with GDP below $20 billion in 2007). 
The rationale for excluding oil exporters is the extreme dependence of their current account 
balance on the price of oil.
9 The rationale for excluding low-income countries is two-fold: first, 
the evolution of their current account balance is affected by specific factors such as external aid, 
and second, many of these countries had periods of extreme current account deficits followed by 
debt reduction and debt forgiveness agreements. In turn, this hinders the ability to conduct 
meaningful inference on the impact of standard macroeconomic and structural fundamentals on 
the current account. Finally, very small countries may have outsized current account volatility 
because of factors such as lumpy imports.  
 
The results are presented in Table 1. In column (1), we report results for the whole sample; in 
column (2), we restrict the sample to the set of advanced economies; and we show results for the 
emerging market subsample in column (3). Columns (4)-(6) repeat the analysis for a specification 
that also includes the terms of trade (in addition to the oil balance).  
 
In terms of the full-sample results, the specification explains 45 percent of the variation in the 
current account balances. In terms of individually significant coefficients, the fiscal balance is 
positive with an estimated coefficient of 0.24, such that an improvement in the fiscal balance of 
four percentage points of GDP is associated with a one percentage point improvement in the 
external balance. In addition, an increase in the relative level of output per capita is correlated 
                                                        
9 That said, results for a sample including oil exporters are remarkably similar to those presented in the paper.   11 
 
with an improvement in the external position. In terms of demographic patterns, an increase in 
the old-age dependency ratio is associated with a decline in the current account. The key role of 
the commodities terms of trade is highlighted by the significant co-movement between the oil 
balance and the current account. In terms of crisis episodes, the general crisis dummy is 
significantly positive, with a further positive effect associated with the Asia crisis in particular. 
 
The results in columns (2) and (3) show that many results are quite similar across the advanced 
and emerging market subsamples.  However, the overall explanatory power is twice as large for 
the advanced group as for the emerging group. In addition, the relative level of GDP per capita 
plays no role in explaining intra-group variation in external balances. There is also a striking 
difference in demographic patterns. For the advanced economies, the main demographic effect 
is that those countries that face a more rapidly ageing population run more positive current 
account balances, while the current account negatively commoves with the old-age dependency 
ratio and the rate of population growth for the emerging group. Finally, within this period, 
financial crises are a significant influence on the current account balances of emerging economies 
but not for advanced economies.  The pattern of results is quite similar for the regressions in 
columns (4)-(6); in addition, we find some evidence that stronger terms of trade are associated 
with improvements in the current account balance for emerging markets.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the capacity of the model to explain the cross-country distribution of current 
account balances by scattering the actual current account balances for the 2005-2008 cross-
section against the fitted values from equation (4) in Table 1. As is clear from the chart, the fit is 
quite high, with a correlation of 0.74. Two factors contribute to the worse fit for emerging 
markets, particularly for recent years. The first is the pattern of current account surpluses in 
emerging Asia after the 1997 crisis. While the Asian crisis dummy captures the turnaround in the 
current account during the period 1997-2000, the surpluses persisted in several countries in   12 
 
subsequent years as well. The second factor is the very large current account deficits in a number 
of emerging European economies, such as Bulgaria and the Baltics.
10 
 
III.1 “Excess” current account and post-crisis outcomes 
 
Next, we construct a measure of the current account “gap” as the difference between the actual 
average current account balance during 2005-2008 (the final four-year interval in our sample) and 
the fitted value from the estimated regression 
 
    
 
We consider   as a proxy for the extent of “excess” current account imbalances 
during the immediate pre-crisis period, in sense that the gap measure reflects current account 
positions that cannot be linked in a systematic fashion to the fundamentals included in our 
benchmark specification.  To the extent that the benchmark regression does a good job in 
capturing the medium-term behavior in the current account, we should expect that those 
countries with the largest negative gaps should experience the largest subsequent current account 
improvement during the crisis period and/or should experience the greatest adjustment 
pressures (as might be captured by real exchange rate and relative demand movements on the 
real side and capital market pressures on the financial side). Conversely, the gap measure will not 
                                                        
10 Gagnon (2011) obtains a much better “fit” for lower-income countries in his current account regression model. 
The reason is the inclusion of official capital flows as an explanatory variable for current account balances—for 
lower-income countries in particular these are the dominant form of flows. However, it is difficult to interpret an 
equation in which capital flows are an independent driver of the current account balance, controlling for other 
fundamentals. 
CAGAP i0508  CAi0508 CA 
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be helpful in explaining the subsequent adjustment pattern if we have omitted key fundamental 
drivers of medium-term current account behavior.
11 
 
We use the fitted values from column (1) in Table 1 to calculate the gap measure. This measure 
is quite robust to alternative specifications to estimate equilibrium current account balances.  For 
example, using the fitted values from the sub-samples reported in columns (2) and (3) in Table 1 
generates gap measures that have a correlation above 0.9 with our measure.  There are similarly 
high correlations if we use the expanded current account measure reported in columns (4)-(6) of 
Table 1.  Moreover, if we add extra variables to the current account equation (such as current or 
capital transfers), this makes little difference to the cross-country variation in the gap term for 
2005-2008. Figure 3 plots the change in the current account between 2008 and 2010 against 
 in Figure 3. The correlation is clearly negative and very strong, even if we omit the 
most extreme cases of current account gaps and current account adjustment: the Baltics, 
Bulgaria, and Iceland.    
 
We next turn to the relation between the current account gap measure and current account 
adjustment during the crisis period. As shown in Figure 4, the bivariate correlation between the 
current account gap and the subsequent change in the current account balance is very strong. We 
look at this link in a multivariate regression that also conditions on the outstanding stock of net 
foreign assets at the onset of the crisis, since a global increase in risk aversion may have placed 
pressure on those countries with the largest outstanding stock of net foreign liabilities, regardless 
of the level of the current account balance relative to fundamental factors. Accordingly, our 
baseline regression takes the following form  
                                                        
11 Although we have included a long list of variables in the panel estimation of equilibrium current account values, 
there are surely other variables that may be helpful in explaining country-specific patterns. However, if our 
estimated gap term is fully explained by such omitted variables, it will not be helpful in explaining the subsequent 
adjustment dynamics. 
0508 i CAGAP  14 
 
  
  ,0508 10 ,0508 ,0407 ii i i CA CAGAP NFA          
 
Where  ,0407 i NFA is the average ratio of NFA to GDP during the period 2004-07. We expect the 
improvement in the current account balance between 2005-08 and 2010 to be greatest for those 
countries with the largest negative current account gaps and—potentially—the largest net 
foreign liability positions.   
 
We run this regression on a variety of country samples.
12 In addition to the full sample of 65 
countries, we also split the sample between countries that adhere to de facto pegged exchange 
rate regimes and non-pegging countries, using the classification in Ghosh et al., 2011. The 
sample of peggers is dominated by EU countries—it includes all euro area countries plus 
Bulgaria and the Baltics, in addition to a few others such as Hong Kong S.A.R.. Furthermore, we 
also report variations within these sub-samples. Among the peggers, we drop the Baltic states 
from some specifications, given the dramatic changes in their current account balances. Among 
the non-peggers, we drop Iceland from some specifications, given the particularly large 
depreciation associated with the effective shut-down of the ISK market during its crisis. Finally, 
as an alternative to running separate sample splits, we also report full-sample results but with 
interaction terms to allow for differential effects across exchange rate regimes.  
 
The results are shown in Table 2. Column (1) shows the baseline full-sample estimates. We split 
the sample between peggers and non-peggers in columns (2)-(3) and (4)-(5), with the latter two 
                                                        
12 We report OLS estimates, with robust standard errors. Although the lagged current account balance implicitly 
shows up on both sides of the equation, the classical errors-in-variables problem relates to non-persistent errors in 
the measurement of the current account. We do not consider these to be systematically important in cross-sectional 
current account data, since the most important types of measurement errors in current account balances tend to be 
chronic in nature. While the gap measure builds on a “generated” variable, the equilibrium current account variable 
is generated from a panel estimation over 1969-2008 and it is not clear how estimation could be improved by jointly 
estimating the 1969-2008 panel and the 2008-2010 cross-section.   15 
 
columns excluding extreme observations (Iceland among floaters and the Baltics among pegs). 
Columns (6) and (7) present regressions for the whole sample with regressors interacted with an 
exchange regime dummy. Across the specifications, the gap measure is significant at the 1 
percent level, with the exception of column (4) where it is significant at the 10 percent level.  The 
estimated coefficient of 0.57 in column (1) means that over half of the measured current account 
gap was closed over the 2008 to 2010 period for the typical country in the sample. A comparison 
of columns (2) and (3) suggests that, for a given current account gap, the size of the subsequent 
current account adjustment was larger among countries with a pegged exchange rate regime, a 
result confirmed in column (6). When extreme observations are dropped (columns (4), (5), and 
(7)) the difference in adjustment across exchange rate regimes ceases to be statistically 
significant—specifically, the dramatic current account adjustment in the Baltics is the main driver 
of the difference in results across exchange rate regimes. Finally, there is some evidence in 
columns (3) and (6) that for pegged exchange rate regimes the size of current account adjustment 
was smaller in countries with large net foreign asset positions, for a given initial current account 
gap. Again, the results are driven by the Baltics (compare with columns (5) and (7)), reflecting 
the fact that these countries had large pre-crisis external liabilities and experienced very large 
current account adjustment.  
 
We next try to shed some light on the underlying mechanisms by which external adjustment 
took place during this period.  We focus on the cross-country variation in real exchange 
movements, relative demand and relative output. As a preliminary step, Figures 5-7 show the 
scatter plots of the real exchange rate, relative domestic demand and relative output against the 
change in the current account balance between 2007 and 2010 (charts using an average for 2005-
08 as the pre-crisis period are similar). Figure 5 shows that the bivariate relation between changes 
in current account balances and changes in the real exchange rate were quite different across 
exchange rate regimes. For the non-peggers, the scatter shows a negative cross-sectional pattern   16 
 
(the correlation is -0.3), with the Icelandic experience being particularly extreme. For the peggers, 
the relation is instead positive (correlation is 0.5), with larger improvements in the current 
account associated with real exchange rate appreciation. For example, the four currency-board 
countries in the EU (the Baltics and Bulgaria) experienced dramatic current account corrections 
without any real depreciation. Instead, Figures 6 and 7 show that changes in current account 
balances are strongly correlated with changes in relative domestic demand and relative output 
(correlations are -0.75 and -0.58, respectively), a relation that holds for both pegged and non-
pegged exchange rate regimes. Indeed, the compression of current account deficits was generally 
associated with steep declines in domestic output and demand relative to the pre-crisis period.  
 
Next, we ask whether changes in the real exchange rate, domestic demand and output can be 
linked to the size of the pre-crisis current account gap measure.  This is relevant, since potential 
lags in the current account adjustment process mean that some of the adjustment pressure may 
show up in these variables even if the current account itself is slow to adjust.  Moreover, the 
relation between the current account gap and these variables may be informative about the 
nature of the adjustment process. Specifically, we estimate the relations between the estimated 
current account gap for the period 2005-08 and the subsequent cross-country variation in real 
exchange rate movements and relative demand and output movements.  That is, we run 
regressions of the form 
 
,07 10 ,0508 ,0407
RER RER RER RER
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where  ,07 10 i RER   is the log change in the real exchange rate between 2007 and 2010,  ,07 10 i DD    17 
 
is the log change in domestic demand between 2007 and 2010, and  ,07 10 i Y   is the log change in 
relative output between 2007 and 2010. 
13 We expect those countries with larger current account 
gaps to be under greater pressure to undergo real depreciation and/or experience a relative 
decline in domestic demand and output. As in the current account regressions, we also control 
for the initial net foreign asset position. 
 
The regression results for the real exchange rate are shown in Table 3. The current account gap 
and the net foreign asset position have no explanatory power in the baseline full-sample 
regression reported in column (1). For floating regimes, we find that the pre-crisis current 
account gap and net foreign asset position are positively correlated with real exchange rate 
movements over 2007-10 (column (2)). The link between the current account gap and real 
appreciation disappears, however, if Iceland—an extreme observation, as shown previously in 
Figure 3—is dropped (column (4)). For the group of countries with an exchange rate peg both 
the pre-crisis current account gap and net foreign assets are statistically significant (column (3)), 
but with the opposite sign. That is, within the pegging group the direction of observed real 
exchange rate movements have been “destabilizing,” in the sense that those countries with large 




Overall, these results suggest that exchange rate adjustment played at most a very modest role in 
the external adjustment process after the crisis. The pattern of real exchange rate adjustment for 
peggers may be driven by several factors. First, trade-weighted real exchange rates also depend 
on fluctuations between the anchor currency and other global currencies (Honohan and Lane 
                                                        
13 We use 2007 as the pre-crisis year for trending variables such as output and demand because it was the peak year 
for both variables for many countries in our sample. Results using averages over 2005-08 are similar. 
14 We also tried an expanded specification in which the terms of trade are an additional regressor. While the terms 
of trade coefficient is itself significant, its inclusion did not alter the results for our variables of interest. Since the 
line of causality between the contemporaneous terms of trade and the real exchange rate is complex, we opt to 
retain our simpler specification in the reported tables.   18 
 
2003, Chen et al 2010). For instance, the euro appreciated by about 10 percent against the dollar 
during 2008-2010,  causing an appreciation in the trade-weighted real exchange rates of the 
periphery deficit countries (which had large negative current account gaps). Second, if there is 
persistence in wage or price setting, inflationary momentum that built up in peggers running 
current account deficits during the pre-crisis boom period may dissipate only slowly.  
 
We turn to an examination of relative domestic demand and relative output dynamics in Table 4.  
External adjustment for deficit countries requires a reduction in the level of domestic demand 
relative to the level of domestic demand in trading partners. The full-sample estimates in column 
(1) show that relative domestic demand grew more slowly, the more negative was the current 
account gap measure, and the results carry through for both floating and pegged exchange rate 
regimes (columns (2) and (3)). The main difference between the two groups relates to the role of 
net foreign assets: for pegged regimes, demand grew more rapidly in countries with higher pre-
crisis net foreign assets, while for floating regimes the constant term is higher, but net foreign 
assets are not associated with faster subsequent demand growth. Results are broadly similar for 
output dynamics: the coefficient on the pre-crisis gap is somewhat smaller and not statistically 
significant in the regression for pegged exchange rate regimes only. The smaller magnitudes are 
consistent with part of the decline in domestic demand mapping into lower imports rather than 
lower domestic production.  
 
In summary, Tables 2-4 provide a multi-dimensional perspective on how the external imbalances 
that expanded during 2005-2008 affected country experiences during the subsequent adjustment 
phase. The regression analysis shows that there has been substantial closure of current account 
gaps. By and large, current account adjustment in deficit countries has clearly relied more on 
“expenditure reduction” than “expenditure switching.” However, the cross-section pattern in 
real exchange rates shows a weak relation to the current account gap within the group of non-  19 
 
peggers, while the direction of real exchange rate movements was destabilizing within the group 
of peggers. Negative current account gaps were associated with sharp declines in relative 
domestic demand and drops in relative output, with pegged exchange rate regimes with higher 
net foreign liabilities experiencing larger output and demand declines and vice versa. 
Accordingly, the distribution of current account gaps at the onset of the crisis is a good predictor 
of the distribution of macroeconomic outcomes during the crisis period itself but with some 
important differences across exchange rate regimes. 
 
III.2 Extensions and robustness checks 
 
We also examined whether the relation between pre-current account “gaps” and subsequent 
outcomes documented in Tables 2-4 depends on whether the current account gap is negative or 
positive. For example, a compression of current account deficits driven by sustainability 
concerns could plausibly be related to excess deficits and high pre-crisis liabilities, but there is no 
symmetric mechanism that would force a more significant adjustment for countries with larger 
positive current account gaps (see also Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011). To be sure, an 
improvement in current account balances for countries with a negative gap will be accompanied 
by a worsening in current accounts in countries with a positive gap in the aggregate, but such 
compression may or may not be systematically related to the size of the positive gap on a 
country-by-country basis.  
 
Accordingly, we split the sample between countries with negative gaps and positive gaps to see if 
adjustment pressures are different across these two groups. The results, presented in Table 5, 
show that qualitatively the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 hold both for countries with 
positive pre-crisis current account gaps and countries with negative pre-crisis gaps. However, the 
magnitude of the co-movement between the current account gap and subsequent changes in the   20 
 
current account balance is much stronger for countries whose current account gaps were 
negative (that is, for countries whose pre-crisis current account balance was weaker than the level 
predicted by fundamentals). Similarly, the evidence suggests that pre-crisis current account gaps 
were more strongly associated with subsequent changes in demand in countries where such gaps 
were negative. In contrast, the relation between the gap term and the behavior of output is 
similar across both groups but it is not statistically significant in explaining differences within 
these groups.  Finally, for the negative gap countries, a large negative net foreign asset position is 
associated with additional downward pressure on domestic demand and output. 
 
Our specification relates current account adjustment during the crisis to the scale of pre-crisis 
“excess” imbalances. A possible criticism of this approach is that there may be an omitted factor 
correlated with initial imbalances which is the true underlying driver of current account 
adjustment. One possible candidate variable is the scale of pre-crisis fiscal imbalances, since 
initial fiscal imbalances may have triggered fiscal austerity during the crisis, leading to an 
improvement in the current account. It is also possible that initial fiscal imbalances could have 
led to a significant change in foreign investors’ assessment of domestic risks and hence a large 
decline in capital inflows, forcing a current account correction. This second story is similar to the 
one outlined in Section II, but sees fiscal imbalances, rather than external imbalances, as playing 
a dominant role. 
15 
 
While it is clear that in a number of cases investor concerns about fiscal imbalances and/or pro-
cyclical fiscal adjustment played an important role in explaining the evolution of the current 
account, output, and demand, we find no systematic evidence of a strong correlation between 
pre-crisis fiscal positions and the behavior of the current account (and the related variables) 
during the crisis period. One reason is that pre-crisis fiscal variables are not a good predictor of 
                                                        
15 We are grateful to Richard Portes for raising this issue in his discussion of our paper.   21 
 
the scale of subsequent fiscal adjustment, since countries with apparently healthy pre-crisis fiscal 
positions (such as Iceland or Ireland) saw dramatic fiscal deterioration during the crisis, with 
fiscal austerity measures only partly offsetting the operation of automatic stabilizers and/or the 
assumption of banking-sector liabilities.
16 Indeed, a sudden stop in capital inflows was plausibly a 
key driver of fiscal deterioration in some countries, through the adverse impact on domestic 
output and, via domestic asset prices, the domestic banking sector. Moreover, in some countries, 
the decline in capital inflows may have prompted activist counter-cyclical fiscal initiatives. In 
related fashion, large pre-crisis current account deficits in many cases were driven by private-
sector external balances. 
 
Table 6 presents the same regressions as in Tables 3 and 5, but adding the ratio of government 
debt to GDP pre-crisis as an explanatory variable. In columns (1) and (2), where the dependent 
variable is the change in the current account balance, the coefficient on government debt is 
actually negative, implying that larger pre-crisis debt is associated with smaller subsequent 
current account adjustment, after controlling for the current account gap and the pre-crisis 
external position.  Similar results (not presented here) hold if we use the pre-crisis fiscal balance. 
This does not rule out an impact of pre-crisis fiscal variables on changes in the current account 
during the crisis, but that impact would occur through the effect of fiscal variables on pre-crisis 
external variables, rather than independently.  
 
III.3 Current account adjustment and capital flows  
 
In the preceding analysis, our primary focus has been on the real implications of the 
compression in current account balances. In this subsection, we address some issues concerning 
                                                        
16 In addition, the fiscal balance is one of the drivers of our equilibrium current account measure. See also Benetrix 
and Lane (2010) on the drivers of fiscal positions during the crisis.   22 
 
financial account behavior.  
 
Table 7 relates the size of the current account gap in 2005-08 to the size of change in net capital 
flows between 2007 and 2010. It partitions the sample between pegs and other exchange rate 
regimes, and focuses on countries with large current account gaps (2 percent of GDP or above 
in absolute terms). The first two rows of the table (upper and lower part) highlight the already-
documented compression in current account imbalances in countries with large gaps. Subsequent 
rows indicate the importance of shifts in net other investment flows in financing the shift in 
current account balances. They also highlight how this shift was particularly large in countries 
with an exchange rate peg—net inflows declined by 9 percent of GDP on average in countries 
with large negative current account gaps (“excess deficits”), and increased by over 6 percent of 
GDP in countries with positive current account gaps. The corresponding changes for other 
exchange rate regimes are much more modest.  
 
These results are confirmed in simple regression analysis (Table 8). Specifically, we relate the 
change in different categories of capital flows between 2007 and 2010 to the size of the current 
account gap and pre-crisis net foreign assets. Our definition of net capital flows is such that a 
positive value implies higher net capital inflows in the country. Columns (1)-(3) present results 
for net other investment flows (capturing net flows in the form of loans, deposits, trade credit 
etc). Changes in net inflows are strongly positively correlated with both the initial current 
account gap and the net foreign asset position. This is consistent with the evidence on gross 
capital flows reported by Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011), who show that bank flows have 
experienced the greatest turnaround during the crisis. Columns (2) and (3) show that the current 
account gap effect is driven by countries with a pegged exchange rate regime.  
 
Columns (4) and (5) present evidence on net FDI and portfolio flows, respectively (for the full   23 
 
sample only). For both types of net flows there is no systematic relation with the explanatory 
variables, including for sample splits by exchange rate regime (not presented here).  Finally, 
columns (6)-(8) present results for net reserve flows. To interpret results, note that higher 
accumulation of reserves in 2010 relative to 2007 would correspond to a negative value for the 
dependent variable (since reserves are capital outflows). Results show that non-peg countries 
with stronger initial net foreign asset position experienced faster reserve accumulation (a result 
primarily driven by creditor countries such as Singapore and Switzerland), while there is no 
significant relation of the change in reserve accumulation with the current account gap. For 
pegged exchange rate regimes, we instead find some evidence of lower reserve accumulation in 
countries with negative current account gaps. Holding constant other flows, lower reserve 
accumulation would be associated with an increase in net capital inflows, and hence a worsening 
of the current account. However, this effect is more than offset for pegged exchange rate 
regimes by the very large swing in net other investment flows.  
 
The process of external adjustment during the crisis was also characterized by sizable external 
assistance from multilateral sources. Belarus, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Romania, and 
Serbia received loans from the International Monetary Fund exceeding 200 percent of their IMF 
quota during the period 2008-2010, as well as loans from the European Union. In addition, some 
deficit countries in the euro area (especially, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) benefited from the 
cross-border liquidity flows from the ECB that were channeled through the national central 
bank. Accordingly, we also investigated whether countries that received official assistance 
undertook more or less current account adjustment. Results are a priori ambiguous. On the one 
side, access to official external finance clearly limits the need for an adjustment in net capital 
flows. On the other side, access to external assistance is not random or exogenous—countries 
that received external finance were likely among those where the turnaround in private flows was 
more dramatic and hence where the current account adjustment may have been larger.   24 
 
 
We proceeded by simply adding a dummy variable for countries that received external assistance 
to the current account adjustment regressions presented in Table 2.
17 The results, presented in 
Table 9, are indeed mixed. For the non-pegger group, the relation between the current account 
gap and subsequent current account adjustment is weaker, as was already documented in Table 
2, and the coefficient on the official assistance dummy is positive (implying that these countries 
undertook more adjustment for a given current account gap). For the pegger group, the link 
between the current account gap and initial net foreign assets on the one hand, and subsequent 
current account adjustment on the other hand is much stronger. However, the coefficient on the 
official assistance dummy is instead significantly negative—this implies that these countries 
undertook less current account adjustment, all else equal, once we control for the size of the 
current account gap and the initial net external position.  
 
One candidate explanation for the weaker pressure for current account adjustment in those 
peggers inside the euro area is that liquidity financing from the ECB has cushioned the adverse 
impact from the reversal in private capital flows. By way of contrast, there was no similar quasi-
automatic replacement of private flows elsewhere (including in other pegged regimes such as the 
Baltic countries or Bulgaria), and hence the sudden stop may have induced more rapid closing of 
the current account gap for these non-euro countries. Indeed, this is a key mechanism that 
defines the difference between membership of a currency union with a common central bank 
and membership of a currency board with no access to the liquidity operations of the anchor 
central bank. Given the limited size of the sample of countries receiving external support, it is 
difficult to test for the effects of liquidity support through the ECB separately from external 
support through other sources. We instead provide some evidence on the quantitative 
                                                        
17 Given differences in the timing of the provision of official external support it is difficult to devise an appropriate 
variable capturing the impact of the overall size of support on the 2010 current account balance.   25 
 
importance of the Eurosystem as a conduit for capital flows during the crisis in Table 10.  The 
table shows net capital flows via the central bank for each member of the euro area periphery, 
where the national central bank is the intermediary for liquidity funding from the ECB.  These 
flows were trivial during the pre-crisis period but became very large for Greece, Portugal, and 
especially for Ireland in 2010.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The large compression in the distribution of current account balances between the pre-crisis 
period and 2010 provides a laboratory for studying the economics of external adjustment. In our 
empirical work, we find that cross-country pattern in current account changes during this period 
worked to correct “excesses” that had emerged during the pre-crisis period. In terms of 
adjustment mechanisms, countries that experienced the largest improvements in current account 
balances had sharper declines (or smaller increases) in output and especially in domestic demand. 
The behavior of real exchange rates diverged across non-pegger and pegger groups, with the real 
exchange rate moving in a destabilizing direction for the latter group. Overall, the main channel 
of external adjustment for deficit countries between the pre-crisis period and 2010 has been 
expenditure compression, rather than expenditure switching. The evidence also suggests a much 
stronger link between pre-crisis current account gaps and subsequent current account changes 
for countries that pre-crisis had negative current account gaps, a finding prima facie consistent 
with the notion that the adjustment burden has fallen primarily on deficit countries.  
 
In relation to the financial account, we find that in countries with exchange rate pegs the 
turnaround in the current account is more strongly related to the initial current account gap than 
in other countries, and that it took place primarily through a dramatic shift in other investment 
flows, which include most banking flows. We also find some suggestive evidence that the scale   26 
 
of current account adjustment in countries with a pegged exchange rate has been cushioned by 
official capital flows—IMF and EU loans but importantly ECB liquidity funds compensated for 
the exit of private capital flows from major deficit countries.  
 
The high output costs that have been associated with rapidly correcting a large current account 
deficit during this episode provide additional empirical support for research that assesses 
whether current account deficits during good times might partly reflect distortions that fail to 
internalize the risk of a subsequent sudden stop. In turn, the design of optimal policy 
interventions in such cases is a further item for the future research agenda. A related issue is the 
extent to which the correction in current account balances will be persistent. The crisis has led to 
a significant downward revision in potential output in several deficit countries, suggesting that 
pre-crisis imbalances in deficit countries may have reflected “overheating” at least to some 
extent. Nevertheless, to the extent that the current account correction in deficit countries was 
caused by an “undershooting” of output and demand (and therefore reflects negative output 
gaps) some of the decline in “excess deficits” (and symmetrically of surpluses) could prove to be 
temporary, unless exchange rate movements allow for more meaningful expenditure switching. 
But another possibility is that countries with high external liabilities may face persistent external 
financing constraints—in this case, if price and exchange rate rigidities prevent effective 
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Appendix. Country sample 
 
country  Peg Advanced country  Peg  Advanced
Argentina  0  0 Latvia  1  0
Australia  0  1 Lithuania  1  0
Austria  1  1 Luxembourg  1  1
Belarus  1  0 Malaysia  0  0
Belgium  1  1 Mexico  0  0
Brazil  0  0 Morocco  0  0
Bulgaria  1  0 Netherlands  1  1
Canada  0  1 New Zealand  0  1
Chile  0  0 Norway  0  1
China, P.R.: Mainland  0  0 Pakistan  0  0
China, P.R.: Hong Kong  1  1 Peru  0  0
Colombia  0  0 Philippines  0  0
Costa Rica  0  0 Poland  0  0
Croatia  1  0 Portugal  1  1
Cyprus  1  1 Romania  0  0
Czech Republic  0  0 Russian Federation  0  0
Denmark  1  1 Serbia, Republic of  0  0
Dominican Republic  0  0 Singapore  0  1
El Salvador  1  0 Slovak Republic  1  0
Estonia  1  0 Slovenia  1  0
Finland  1  1 South Africa  0  0
France  1  1 Spain  1  1
Germany  1  1 Sri Lanka  0  0
Greece  1  1 Sweden  0  1
Guatemala  0  0 Switzerland  0  1
Hungary  0  0 Taiwan  1  0
Iceland  0  1 Thailand  0  0
India  0  0 Tunisia  0  0
Indonesia  0  0 Turkey  0  0
Ireland  1  1 Ukraine  0  0
Israel  0  1 United Kingdom  0  1
Italy  1  1 United States  0  1
Japan  0  1 Uruguay  0  0
Korea, Republic of  0  0    
 
Notes: “peg” refers to de facto exchange rate regime classification for the period 2005-08. 
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                       Table 1. Drivers of Current Account Balance, 1969-2008 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ALL  ADV  EM  ALL  ADV  EM 
        
Fiscal balance  0.243***  0.273***  0.266** 0.244***  0.274*** 0.275** 
  (0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) 
Growth differential  -0.072  0.32  -0.183*  -0.08  0.31  -0.20** 
  (0.09) (0.27) (0.09) (0.09) (0.27) (0.09) 
Dependency  ratio  -0.15** 0.12  -0.30***  -0.16** 0.13  -0.32*** 
  (0.06) (0.14) (0.10) (0.07) (0.15) (0.10) 
Population  growth  -0.74 0.30  -1.42**  -0.75 0.26  -1.51*** 
  (0.47) (0.96) (0.60) (0.48) (0.98) (0.55) 
Aging  speed  0.056 0.222** -0.142  0.046  0.222* -0.158* 
  (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) (0.12) (0.09) 
Relative GDP per capita  0.027*  0.013  0.043  0.028*  -0.005  0.041 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Lagged NFA  0.049***  0.046***  0.050*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Crisis  dummy  0.018** 0.004  0.015*  0.018** 0.002  0.014* 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Financial  center  dummy  0.014  0.022  0.013  0.020  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Asian crisis dummy  0.037***  0.02  0.034**  0.035** 0.022 0.032** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Oil balance  0.239***  0.262***  0.214** 0.239***  0.280*** 0.232** 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
Oil balance Norway  0.14  0.14    0.171  0.21   
  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.25)  
Log terms of trade  0.0107  0.0141  0.0161* 
 (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
Constant  0.007 0.002 0.004 -0.041  -0.067  -0.072 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.21) (0.05) 
      
Observations  503 234 269 496 227 269 
R2  0.45 0.60 0.29 0.44 0.60 0.30 
Note: Panel estimation, 4-year averages. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 




    33 
 
 
Table 2. Current Account Adjustment, 2010 vs 2005-08 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
         
Sample→ 
 




All All  excl 
ICE, 
Baltics 
          
CA  gap  -0.57*** -0.44*** -0.84*** -0.39***  -0.58*  -0.44***  -0.39*** 
  [0.12] [0.07] [0.19] [0.07] [0.30] [0.07]  [0.07] 
 
CA  gap*peg        -0.40**  -0.19 
        [0.20]  [0.30] 
 
NFA/GDP 2004-07  -0.01  0.00  -0.03*  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.00 
  [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] 
 
NFA * peg            -0.03*  -0.02 
        [0.02]  [0.02] 
 
Peg        0.00  -0.00 
        [0.01]  [0.01] 
 
constant  0.01** 0.01**  0.01  0.01*  0.00  0.01**  0.01* 
  [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]  [0.00] 
          
N  65 42 23 41 20 65  61 
R2  0.42 0.44 0.49 0.31 0.38 0.51  0.36 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the ratio of the current account to GDP between 2005-08 
and 2010. The sample in columns (4) and (7) exclude Iceland; the sample in columns (5) and (7) exclude 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. OLS 
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Table 3. Real Exchange Rate Adjustment, 2007-2010 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
Sample→ 
 




All All  excl 
ICE, 
Baltics 
         
CA  gap  0.48 0.81*  -0.50***  0.28  -0.39**  0.81* 0.28 
  [0.38] [0.47] [0.12] [0.30] [0.15] [0.48] [0.31] 
         
CA  gap*peg        -1.31**  -0.66* 
        [0.49]  [0.34] 
         
NFA/GDP  2004-07  -0.00  0.04* -0.04*  0.03** -0.03  0.04* 0.03** 
  [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
         
NFA  *  peg        -0.07**  -0.07** 
        [0.03]  [0.03] 
         
Peg        -0.04  -0.05** 
        [0.02]  [0.02] 
         
constant  0.02  0.03  -0.01 0.04** -0.02  0.03 0.04** 
  [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] 
         
N  65 42 23 41 20 65 61 
R2  0.06 0.20 0.44 0.06 0.35 0.24 0.14 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage change in the real effective exchange rate between 2007 
and 2010. The sample in columns (4) and (7) exclude Iceland; the sample in columns (5) and (7) exclude 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. OLS 
estimation with robust standard errors. 
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Table 4. Demand and Output Adjustment, 2007-2010 
 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Sample→  All No  peg Peg  All No  peg Peg 
  
Dependent var.  →  Change in demand  Change in output 
        
CA  gap  1.46*** 1.35***  1.29**  0.77*** 0.70***  0.55 
  [0.298] [0.366] [0.612] [0.212] [0.208] [0.465] 
        
NFA/GDP  2004-07  0.02  0.00 0.06*** 0.01  0.00 0.03*** 
  [0.013] [0.016] [0.018] [0.009] [0.014] [0.011] 
        
Constant  0.02 0.05*** -0.02 0.04***  0.06*** 0.00 
  [0.014] [0.013] [0.024] [0.010] [0.010] [0.017] 
        
N  65 40 25 65 40 25 
R2  0.36 0.42 0.31 0.23 0.24 0.17 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the change in total domestic demand between 2007 and 2010 in columns (1), 
(2), and (3) and the change in real GDP between 2007 and 2010 in columns (4), (5), and (6). CA gap is the 
difference between actual and fitted value for the CA to GDP ratio, 2005-08. *,**, *** denote significance 
at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. OLS estimation with robust standard errors. 
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Table 5. Crisis outcomes and sign of current account gap 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













Sample →  CA gap<0 CA gap>0 CA gap<0 CA gap>0 CA gap<0  CA gap>0
     
CA gap  -0.90***  -0.23**  1.87***  1.02**  0.66  0.65 
    [0.258] [0.097] [0.612] [0.451] [0.401] [0.409] 
     
NFA/GDP  2004-07  -0.02  0.00 0.04** -0.01 0.02** 0.00 
    [0.013] [0.010] [0.019] [0.023] [0.012] [0.020] 
     
Constant  -0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.03  0.04** 
    [0.014] [0.007] [0.030] [0.022] [0.020] [0.020] 
     
Observations  28 37 28 37 28 37 
R2  0.45 0.08 0.37 0.10 0.19 0.06 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the change in the current account balance between 2005-08 and 2010 in 
columns (1) and (2); the change in total domestic demand between 2007 and 2010 in columns (3) and (4); 
and the change in real GDP between 2007 and 2010 in columns (5) and (6). The sample in columns (1), 
(3), and (5) includes countries with a negative CA gap (the difference between actual and fitted value for 
the CA to GDP ratio) for 2005-08. The sample in columns (2), (4), and (6) includes countries with a 
positive CA gap for 2005-08. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. OLS 




Table 6. Pre-crisis fiscal variables and post-crisis outcomes 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 






















     
Sample  All Peg All Peg All Peg All Peg 
     
CA gap  -0.57***  -0.67*** 0.39  -0.48*** 1.48*** 0.72  0.80***  0.22 
  [0.109] [0.197] [0.403] [0.123] [0.300] [0.507] [0.222] [0.395] 
          
NFA/GDP  2004-07  -0.01 -0.03** 0.00  -0.04* 0.02*  0.08*** 0.01 0.05***
  [0.012] [0.013] [0.016] [0.021] [0.013] [0.020] [0.009] [0.016] 
          
Gov.  debt/GDP  -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.03 
  [0.017] [0.047] [0.000] [0.000] [0.053] [0.107] [0.041] [0.067] 
          
Constant  0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.09  0.04*  -0.03 
  [0.011] [0.028] [0.022] [0.021] [0.030] [0.064] [0.022] [0.039] 
          
Observations  65 23 65 23 65 23 65 23 
R2  0.42 0.53 0.08 0.44 0.36 0.36 0.23 0.24 
Note: Dependent variable is the change in the current account balance between 2005-08 and 2010 in 
columns (1) and (2); the change in the real effective exchange rate between 2007 and 2010 in columns (3) 
and (4); the change in total domestic demand between 2007 and 2010 in columns (5) and (6); and the 
change in real GDP between 2007 and 2010 in columns (7) and (8). Sample for columns (1), (3), (5), and 
(7) includes all countries; sample for columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) include countries with a de facto peg. 
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(> 2% of 
GDP) 
exchange rate regime  Peg  No peg 
        
Current account gap 2005-08  -5.0 4.2  -4.5  5.2 
        
Current account balance, 2010 vs 2005-08  5.2 0.2  2.8  -1.4 
        
Change in net other inv. flows, 2007-2010  -9.5 6.1  -1.6  -0.1 
        
Change in net direct inv. flows, 2007-2010  -2.2 -4.3  -1.6  -0.1 
        
Change in net portf. inv. flows, 2007-2010  1.1 0.9  0.5  0.5 
        
Change in FX reserve flows, 2007-2010  2.6 -2.0  0.8  0.0 
        
Number of observations  13 5  9  20 
Source: authors’ calculations based on International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics. 
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Table 8. Change in capital flows and current account gap 
 
   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)








Change in reserve flows
Sample→  All No  peg Peg All All All No  peg Peg
                          
CA gap  0.68** 0.18 1.27*** 0.27  0.02  -0.07 0.20  -0.37**
[0.262] [0.158] [0.401] [0.232]  [0.229]  [0.176]  [0.188]  [0.169]
NFA 2004-07  0.06** 0.04*** 0.08  0.00  -0.02  -0.04 -0.07**  -0.01
[0.027] [0.013] [0.049] [0.010]  [0.033]  [0.023]  [0.025]  [0.016]
Constant  -0.01 0.00 -0.01  -0.01** 0.01  -0.01  -0.02*  0.00 
[0.015] [0.008] [0.030] [0.007]  [0.016]  [0.009]  [0.012]  [0.009]
Observations  64 41 23 64  64  64 41  23 
R2  0.25 0.27 0.31 0.08  0.01  0.21 0.36  0.28 
Note: change in net capital flows defined as the difference between net capital flows in 2010 and 
2007 (as a ratio of 2007 GDP). Net capital flows are the difference between capital inflows and 
capital outflows. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. OLS estimation 
with robust standard errors. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics. 
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Table 9. Current account adjustment, external finance, and current account gap 
 










        
Current account gap, 2005-08  -0.59*** -0.33*** -1.00*** -0.31***  -0.83*** 
    [0.12] [0.07] [0.20] [0.07]  [0.10] 
 
NFA to GDP, 2004-2007  -0.01  0.00  -0.03*** 0.00  -0.03*** 
    [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] 
 
External finance dummy  -0.01  0.04**  -0.06*  0.04**  -0.08** 
    [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]  [0.03] 
 
Constant  0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.02*** 
    [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]  [0.01] 
           
Observations  65 42 23 41  22 
R2  0.42 0.56 0.61 0.45  0.68 
                   
 
Note: Dependent variable is the change in the current account balance/GDP ratio between 2005-08 and 
2010. The current account gap is the difference between actual and fitted value for the CA to GDP ratio, 
2005-08. The “external finance dummy” takes the value of 1 for countries receiving net external official 
finance during the 2008-2010 period in the form of IMF loans, EU loans, or ECB liquidity provision to 
banks. The countries are Belarus, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Serbia, Romania, 
Spain, and Ukraine. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. OLS 
estimation with robust standard errors. 
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Table 10. Euro Periphery: Net Capital Flows Via Central Banks 
 
Net Capital Flows Via Central Banks






Note:  Ratios to GDP. Calculated from IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics and External Debt 





Figure 1.  Standard Deviation of Current Account Balances, 1990-2010 
 
 
Note:  Cross-country standard deviation of current account balances (ratios to GDP). Sample 
excludes Timor Leste. Sample excluding extreme observations (blue line) also excludes Brunei 
Darussalam, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Nicaragua, and Qatar. 
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Note: country groups defined as follows: 
 
GRE, IRE, PRT, ESP: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain (simple average) 
Other crisis CEE: Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine (simple average) 
Emerging Asia: Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand (simple average). 
GCC oil exporters: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia (simple 
average) 
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Note:   Scatter of actual current account balance against fitted current account balance (average 
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Figure 4.  Change in Current Account Balance and Current Account Gap 
 
 
Note:   Scatter of changes in the current account balance between 2005-08 and 2010 against the 
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Figure 5. Change in current account/GDP and change in real exchange rates, 2007-2010 
 
A.  No peg 
 
B.  Peg 
 
Note: “change in REER 2007-10” is the log change in the CPI-based real effective exchange rate index between 
2007 and 2010. “Change in CA/GDP ratio 2007-10” is the difference between the CA/GDP ratio in 2010 and 
2007. Source: authors’ calculations based on International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Balance 
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Figure 6. Change in current account/GDP and change in relative domestic demand, 2007-2010 
 
Figure 7. Change in current account/GDP and change in relative output, 2007-2010 
 
Note to Figures 6-7: “change in real domestic demand 2007-10” is the log change in real domestic demand between 
2007 and 2010. The change in real GDP, 2007-10 is defined analogously. “Change in CA/GDP ratio 2007-10” is 
the difference between the CA/GDP ratio in 2010 and 2007. Source: authors’ calculations based on International 
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